By Maxwell Akalaare Adombila and Ange Kasongo
DAKAR/KINSHASA, March 2 (Reuters) – The U.S. has made progress in its push to prise Congo’s strategic minerals from China’s orbit, but conflict, contested licences and compliance demands are still slowing Washington’s advance into a region its rival dominates, diplomats and industry officials said.
Democratic Republic of Congo, which hosts the world’s largest cobalt supply and rich copper and lithium reserves, is central to the U.S. push to cut the West’s reliance on China for rare minerals.
After the U.S. and Congo signed a minerals pact in December, Kinshasa last month handed Washington a 44-project shortlist spanning copper, cobalt, lithium, tin, gold and hydrocarbons, Reuters reported.
The U.S.–Congo partnership is meant to unlock investment, the U.S. State Department said, and support implementation of a peace deal Washington brokered between Congo and Rwanda, which Kinshasa has accused of supporting M23 rebels fighting Congolese troops in its east.
But several of the shortlisted assets sit in politically fraught zones or carry permitting disputes, making quick, reliable mining deals unlikely, said the sources, who include Congolese government and mining officials. They asked not to be named because the discussions are sensitive.
CONGO SLOWING DEALS, SOURCE SAYS
One U.S. diplomat said Kinshasa is deliberately slowing new deals to push Washington to increase pressure on M23 before any further steps are taken. Reuters could not independently verify the claim.
The Congolese government did not immediately respond to requests for comment. On background, a senior government official described the allegations as “speculation”.
“The agreement has its own rhythm: a period for receiving offers, a period for negotiation,” the official said. Rwanda, which denies backing M23, did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
The U.S. State Department told Reuters the U.S. remains “deeply concerned” by violence in eastern Congo and is pushing regional partners to reinforce the ceasefire, urging Rwanda to end M23 support and withdraw in line with December’s peace deal.
The department said Washington hopes to see swift progress on key deals, including a proposal for Glencore to sell copper and cobalt assets to the U.S.-backed Orion consortium, U.S.-based Virtus Minerals’ bid for Congo-focused Chemaf, and the extension of the Lobito Corridor railway line.
Kinshasa’s inclusion on the shortlist of the Rubaya mine, which supplies about 15% of global coltan and sits under M23/AFC control, signals Congo wants stronger U.S. action on M23, said Joshua Walker of NYU’s Congo Research Group.
Investment is unlikely while the group holds territory, he said.
U.S. influence on security has already been seen at some mines. Alphamin Resources restarted its Bisie tin mine only after U.S. diplomatic pressure helped ease fighting in territory around the site, though it warns that renewed clashes could threaten access and operations.
PERMITTING GRIDLOCK
Congo’s permitting gridlock is a structural brake on new U.S. investment, said Michael Bahati, chief analyst at advisory firm Ascendance Strategies, but additionally some assets on Kinshasa’s list are mired in disputes, incomplete rights and ownership records, and slow transparency reporting.
At Manono, a global-class lithium resource, U.S.-backed KoBold is currently trying to settle a dispute with Australia’s AVZ, while China’s Zijin in the same area is preparing shipments in June.
High-grade copper-cobalt assets, including the Chemaf and Gecamines’ concessions, face political disputes and permitting histories that deter Western lenders. Chemaf’s sale to U.S.-backed Virtus has slowed after the owners signaled that the roughly $30 million bid does not cover the firm’s heavy debts.
Even for so-called “easy wins” — tailings reprocessing, for instance, or proposed cobalt refineries — Kinshasa has signaled that success hinges on governance reforms and security guarantees that only Washington can help deliver.
The bottlenecks expose a gap between U.S. strategic intent and its ability to mobilise capital at speed, said Geraud-Christian Neema, an analyst of the geopolitics of natural resources in Africa.
Washington’s focus remains on “ready-to-produce” assets. A longer-term shift would require U.S. companies willing to shoulder Congo-level risk and wait years for returns, a commitment “not many U.S. firms are prepared to make”, he said.
WESTERN PROCEDURE VS CHINESE PACE
Congolese officials acknowledge they want American players to move faster, but say they cannot circumvent compliance obligations.
While U.S. and other Western firms are often bound by obligations such as clearing anti-bribery checks, proving clean title chains, and documenting community impact risks, Chinese companies are not subject to the same regimes.
At Manono, Zijin’s head-start in building out roads, power and port links is already shaping the project. KoBold’s Congo head said the company will look to share that infrastructure once its ownership disputes are resolved, a pace that reflects the compliance burden U.S.-backed firms face.
The contrast is clear for Congo’s mining sector – Chinese operators can absorb uncertainty that Western firms cannot, allowing Beijing-linked companies to advance projects while U.S. companies remain stuck in due-diligence loops.
For now, Kinshasa has succeeded in pulling Washington deeper into its critical-minerals orbit, betting U.S. attention will translate into security and political dividends, NYU’s Walker said.
“What that engagement will ultimately look like, however, remains uncertain.”
But with Chinese firms already controlling over 70% of Congo’s copper-cobalt and other rare mineral assets, nothing yet suggests Washington can significantly loosen Beijing’s grip.
(Reporting by Ange Adihe Kasongo from Kinshasa; Reporting and writing by Maxwell Akalaare Adombila in Dakar; Editing by Veronica Brown and Jan Harvey)
Comments